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A scheme for secure multiparty quantum summation was proposed by Run-hau Shi et
al.,(SCIENTIFIC REPORTS, 6:19655, DOI:10.1038/srep19655). IBM Corporation has released
a superconductivity based 5-qubit quantum computer named “Quantum Experience” and placed
it on “cloud”. In this paper we take advantage of the online availability of this real quantum pro-
cessor(ibmqx2) and carry out the above protocol that has never been experimentally demonstrated
earlier. Here, we set up experiments for secure quantum summation of one-qubit secret states .
Besides, we propose a protocol for square and cubic summation and also simulate the proposed
protocol for both cases. Experimental implementation of secure multiparty quantum summation
protocol for two or more qubit secret state and the proposed protocol for square(and cubic) sum-
mation are not possible using the available 5-qubit quantum processor(ibmqx2). IBM has recently
placed a 16-qubit quantum processor(ibmqx3) on the cloud but it is still not accessible for all users.
We describe a simulation for two and three qubit secret state and proposed protocol for square(and
cubic) summation using a simulator(Custom Topology) which is provided by IBM Corporation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In our everyday lives, we generate and keep a lot
of data which are highly confidential. Secure Mul-
tiparty Computation (SMC) plays an important role
in Cryptography[1], makes it possible to execute spe-
cific programs on confidential data, while ensuring that
no sensitive information from the data is leaked[2].
IBM Corporation has released the Quantum Experience
which allows users to access 5-qubit quantum proces-
sor(ibmqx2). We take advantage of the online availabil-
ity of this real hardware and present the secure mul-
tiparty quantum summation. Here, we experimentally
implement a protocol which is given by Run-hau Shi
et al.[3], using the five-qubit superconductivity based
quantum computer. We also propose a protocol for
square and cubic summation and simulate the proposed
protocol for both cases. IBM quantum processor[7]
which we have used here, is placed at T.J.Watson lab,
York Town, USA. Till now several groups have used
the 5-qubit quantum computer to demonstrate various
experiments[8],[9],[10],[11],[12]. Recently, we have also
used this processor to implement few experiments(to be
placed in arXiv soon). These are non-destructive dis-
crimination of arbitrary orthogonal quantum states and
no-hiding theorem[18], which were earlier implemented
using NMR quantum processors[14],[15],[16]. Recently
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several groups have discussed hardware for superconduc-
tivity based quantum processor[4],[5],[6]. Recently Pani-
grahi et al. have also placed on arXiv experimental veri-
fication of a “Quantum Cheque” and “No-Hiding Theo-
rem”, using ibmqx2[19],[20].
II. PROTOCOL FOR SECURE MULTIPARTY
QUANTUM SUMMATION
Let, there be m parties; P1, P2, ......, Pm(where m > 2)
and each party Pi(where 1 ≤ i ≤ m) has a secret
integer yi ∈ {0, 1, ....., N − 1} where, N = 2n. All
parties jointly compute the summation S =
m∑
i=1
yimodN
without disclosing their respective secret yis to each
other. According to the reference[3], the protocol for the
secure multiparty quantum summation is given in Fig.1.
Fig.1: Circuit diagram for the protocol for m
number of parties and n-qubit case. QFT and
IQFT are the Quantum Fourier Transform and
Inverse Quantum Fourier Transform respec-
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2tively. U j’s are the ORACLE operators having n
ancilla qubits as the control qubits.
• Let, P1 be the initiator party and prepares an n-
qubit basis state |y1〉h and this is the private se-
cret of P1. P1 then applies the quantum Fourier
transform[13],[17] to the state |y1〉h and gets the
following state,(Eq.1)
|φ1〉 = QFT |y1〉h = 1√
2n
2n−1∑
j=0
e2pii
y1
2n j |j〉h (1)
• After that, P1 prepares a n-qubit ancillary state
|0〉t
⊗
n
and performs n-CNOT gate operations on
the product state |φ1〉|0〉t
⊗
n
, where each qubit of
the first n-qubits is the control qubit and the cor-
responding qubit of second n-qubit is the target
qubit. Then the resultstant state is (Eq.2)
|φ2〉 = CNOT
⊗
n|φ1〉|0〉t
⊗
n
=
1√
2n
2n−1∑
j=0
e2pii
y1
2n j |j〉h|j〉t
(2)
where, the subscript h denotes that the qubit will
stay at home and t denotes that the qubit will be
transmitted through the authentic quantum chan-
nel.
• Then P1 sends the |j〉t state to P2 through the au-
thentic quantum channel.
• After getting this |j〉t state, P2 prepares a se-
cret state |y2〉 and applies an oracle[3],[13] oper-
ator Cj(where, Cj : |j〉t|y2〉 → |j〉tU j |y2〉 and
U |y2〉 = e2pii
y2
2n |y2〉) on the product state |j〉t|y2〉,
the total resultant state is (Eq.3),
|φ3〉 = Cj 1√
2n
2n−1∑
j=0
e2pii
y1
2n j |j〉h|j〉t|y2〉
=
1√
2n
2n−1∑
j=0
e2pii
y1+y2
2n j |j〉h|j〉t|y2〉. (3)
• After that, P2 sends this |j〉t to P3 through the au-
thentic quantum channel and P3 also follows the
same protocol which P2 followed. This protocol
is repeated m − 1 times. If everyone honestly fol-
lows the protocol, the total resultant state will be
(Eq.4),
|φ4〉 = 1√
2n
2n−1∑
j=0
e2pii[
∑m
i=1 yi/2
n]j |j〉h|j〉t|y2〉....|ym〉. (4)
Then, Pm sends the |j〉t state to P1 through the
authentic quantum channel.
• After getting the |j〉t state, P1 applies the n-CNOT
gate on this state to check that there is any dishon-
est person or not. If everyone follows the protocol
honestly, P1 will get |0〉
⊗
n state. Now the resul-
tant state is (Eq.5),
|φ5〉 = 1√
2n
2n−1∑
j=0
e2pii[
∑m
i=1 yi/2
n]j |j〉h|0〉t|y2〉....|ym〉. (5)
• At last, P1 applies the inverse quantum Fourier
transformation[3],[13],[17] to get the result of sum-
mation as (Eq.6)
S =
m∑
i=1
yimodN. (6)
.
III. EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION
1. For three party (m = 3) and one qubit (n = 1) secret
state, assume that secret integers for P1, P2 and P3 are 0,1
and 0 respectively.
Fig.2: Figure showing the experimental imple-
mentation of the protocol for m=3 and n=1. q[1]
is the ancilla qubit.
According to the protocol, Hadamard gate is taken to
be the quantum Fourier transform[13],[17] (Fig. 2). Af-
ter this, P1 applies the controlled-not gate on the an-
cilla qubit and sends this qubit(q[1]) to P2 through the
authenticated quantum channel. Then P2 makes secret
state |1〉 and applies the controlled-U (where q[1] is the
control bit and q[2] is the target bit), yielding (Eq.7)
controlled U = H2
⊗
CNOT1,2
⊗
H2. (7)
After that, P2 iterate this operator(means applies
controlled-U2 and controlled-U4 respectively, those
are 4 × 4 identity operator). P2 then sends the q[2]
qubit to P3 using the authenticated quantum channel.
Similarly, P3 makes own secret state |0〉 and applies the
controlled-U j (where q[1] is the control bit and q[3] is
the target bit)(Eq.8).
Here,
controlled U = controlled identity1,3. (8)
3Therefore, overall controlled-U operations can be
realized by the optimized oracle[3],[13] operator given in
Fig 2.
After that, P2 sends the ancillary qubit q[1] to P1
through the authenticated quantum channel. After get-
ting the ancillary state, P1 again applies controlled-not
gate on q[1] qubit and measures the q[1] in the computa-
tional basis. Here we assume that all parties are honest,
therefore P1 will get the |0〉 state when he measure the
q[1]. Then P1 will apply the IQFT[3],[13],[17] operation
on his qubit and get the result of summation. Thereti-
cally, the summation would be(Eq.9),
S =
3∑
i=1
yimod2 = (0 + 1 + 0)mod2 = 1 (9)
The result of this experiment using the IBM quantum
computer is given in Fig. 3,
Fig.3: Figure showing the experimental result
of the protocol for m = 3 and n = 1. The above
result is obtained by taking an average of 8192
number of shots. The state 1 is obtained with a
probability 0.882.
The probability improves as the number of shots is
increased. For example, for 1024 shots, we obtained a
probability of 0.863(data not shown).
2. For four party (m = 4) and one qubit (n = 1) secret
state, assume that secret integers for P1, P2, P3 and P4 are
1,1,0 and 0 respectively.
Fig.4: Figure showing the experimental imple-
mentation of the protocol for m = 4 and n = 1.
Here, q[1] is the ancilla qubit.
The oracle[3],[13] operator for P2 is also given as eq.[7].
The oracle[3],[13] operator for P3 is given as eq.[8], and
the oracle[3],[13] operator for P4 is given by(Eq.10),
controlled U = controlled identity1,4. (10)
Thus, overall controlled-U operation can be realized
by the optimized oracle operator given in Fig 4.
The final result that P1 should get is (Eq.11),
S =
4∑
i=1
yimod2 = (1 + 1 + 0 + 0)mod2 = 0. (11)
The experimental result is given in Fig.5,
Fig.5: Figure showing the experimental result
of the protocol for m = 4 and n = 1. The above
result is obtained by taking an average of 8192
number of shots. The state 0 is obtained with a
probability 0.938.
3. For four party (m = 4) and one qubit (n = 1) secret
state, assume that secret integers for P1, P2, P3 and P4 are
1,1,0 and 1 respectively.
Fig.6: Figure showing the experimental imple-
mentation of the protocol for m = 4 and n = 1.
q[1] is the ancilla qubit.
In this experiment, while implementing the optimized
oracle operator controlled-Z(given in Fig.7), we needed
a controlled-not operation taking q[1] as a control qubit
and q[4] as a target qubit. But according to the coupling
map of this ibmqx2 processor given in the figure 8. We
cannot construct the oracle[3],[13] operator directly. So,
we modify the oracle operator in this experiment.
4Fig.7: Decomposition of controlled-Z operator
using the available quantum gates(H and CNOT
gate) in ibmqx2 processor.
Fig.8: ibmqx2 processor[7]. Coupling map
= {0 : [1, 2], 1 : [2], 3 : [2, 4], 4 : [2]} where, a: [b]
means a CNOT with qubit a as control and b as
target can be implemented.
The oracle[3],[13] operator for P2 is given by(Eq.12),
controlled U
= H1H1
⊗
H2
⊗
CNOT1,2
⊗
H2
⊗
H1H1. (12)
For P3 the oracle operator is a controlled-identity
operator. The oracle[3],[13] operator for P4 is given
by(Eq.13),
controlled U
= H4H4
⊗
H2
⊗
CNOT4,2
⊗
H2
⊗
H4H4. (13)
Therefore, overall controlled-U operation can be
realized by the optimized oracle operator given in Fig.9.
Fig.9: Figure showing the modified oracle
operator of the experimental implementation of
the protocol for m = 4 and n = 1. q[2] is the
ancilla qubit.
The measurement result would be (Eq.14),
S =
4∑
i=1
yimod2 = (1 + 1 + 0 + 1)mod2 = 3mod2 = 1.
(14)
The experimental result from the 5-qubit quantum
computer is given in Fig.10,
Fig.10: Figure showing the experimental result
of the protocol for m = 4 and n = 1. The above
result is obtained by taking an average of 8192
number of shots. The state 1 is obtained with a
probability 0.773.
The fidelity[8] of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd experiment
are 93.91%, 96.85%, and 47.64% respectively. For fi-
delity calculation we use the equation-(15) The lower
fidelity of the 3rd experiment is due to the incom-
plete coupling map(Fig.8) leading to more number of
operators as given in Fig.9. We also calculate “aver-
age absolute deviation(〈∆x〉)” and “maximum absolute
deviation(∆xmax)” using equation-(16),(17) for the 1
st,
2nd and 3rd experiment. The summary of the result
of the experiments is given in the table-1 and the state
tomography[8] of the experimental density matrix of each
experiment are given in Fig.11,12,13.
Fidelity = Tr
√√
ρT .ρE .
√
ρT (15)
In equation-(15) ρT is the theoretical density matrix and
ρE is the experimental density matrix.
〈∆x〉 = 1
N2
N∑
i,j=1
|xTi,j − xEi,j | (16)
∆xmax = Max|xTi,j − xEi,j | (17)
∀i, j ∈ {1, N}
In equations-(16),(17)xTi,j is the element of theoretical
density matrix and xEi,j is the element of experimental
density matrix.
5Fig.11: The left part and right part of the figure
show the real and imaginary part of the experi-
mental density matrix of the experiment-1 respec-
tively.
Fig.12: The left part and right part of the figure
show the real and imaginary part of the experi-
mental density matrix of the experiment-2 respec-
tively.
Fig.13: The left part and right part of the figure
show the real and imaginary part of the experi-
mental density matrix of the experiment-3 respec-
tively.
Expt. No. 〈∆x〉 ∆xmax Fidelity
1 11.92% 12.05% 93.91%
2 7.23% 8.27% 96.85%
3 24.12% 25.54% 47.64%
Table-1: This table shows the average ab-
solute deviation(〈∆x〉), maximum absolute
deviation(∆xmax) and the fidelity of the experi-
ments.
IV. SIMULATION OF THE PROTOCOL FOR
THE GENERALIZED CASE FOR n ≥ 2
In this case, according to the protocol, number of
parties(m) should be greater than two. In the ibmqx2
processor, the number of qubits is five. For one qubit
secret state (yi ∈ {0, 1}) case we can consider maximum
4-parties, because out of five qubit one should be ancilla
qubit. Consider two qubit secret state (yi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}),
minimum number of parties should be three and two
qubit ancilla state, then the total number of qubits should
be eight. But, only five qubits are available in the ibmqx2
processor. For this limitation, we are not able to execute
this protocol for two or more qubits using this processor.
However, there is a quantum simulator available in IBM
Quantum Experience namely Custom Topology, which
we use to simulate this protocol for two and three qubit
secret integer, and more number of parties for one qubit
secret integer. In the next subsections(A,B and C), we
show the simulations. Unlike experiments “simulation
results” appear with probability 1.
A. For three party (m = 3) and two qubit (n = 2)
secret integer
Fig.14: Figure showing the simulation of the
protocol for m = 3 and n = 2. The yis are taken
to be 3, 0 and 0 respectively and q[2], q[3] are the
ancilla qubits.
According to the procedure, we apply the QFT and
CNOT
⊗
2 gate respectively. Here, the oracle opera-
tors are identity operators. So, the measurement result
should be(Eq.18)
S =
3∑
i=1
yimod4 = (3 + 0 + 0)mod4 = 3 (18)
The simulated result is given in Fig.15,
Fig.15: Figure showing the simulated result of
the protocol for m = 3 and n = 2. The state 11(bi-
nary representation of 3) is obtained with proba-
bility 1.0.
6B. For three party (m = 3) and three qubit (n = 3)
secret integer
Fig.16: Figure showing the simulation of the
protocol for m = 3 and n = 3. The yis are taken
to be 6, 0 and 0 respectively and q[3], q[4], q[5] are
the ancilla qubits.
Here, oracle operators are identity operators. So, the
measurement result should be(Eq.19)
S =
3∑
i=1
yimod8 = (6 + 0 + 0)mod8 = 6 (19)
The simulated result is given in Fig.17,
Fig.17: Figure showing the simulated result of
the protocol for m = 3 and n = 3. The state
110(binary representation of six) with probabil-
ity 1.0.
C. For fifteen party (m = 15) and one qubit (n = 1)
secret integer
Fig.18: Figure showing the simulation of the
protocol for m = 15 and n = 1. The yis are
taken to be 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0,
1, 1 and 0 respectively and q[1] is the ancilla qubit.
Here, the oracle operator for P2, P5, P7, P10, P11, P12
and P15 is controlled-identity operator. Oracle operator
for others is controlled-Z operator. So, the measurement
result should be(Eq.20),
S =
15∑
i=1
yimod2
= (1+0+1+1+0+1+0+1+1+0+0+0+1+1+0)mod2 = 0.
(20)
The simulated result is given in Fig.19,
Fig.19: Figure shows the simulated result of the
protocol for m = 15 and n = 1. The state 0 is
obtained with probability 1.0.
V. PROTOCOL FOR SQUARE AND CUBIC
SUMMATION
Here, we propose a protocol for square summation us-
ing the protocol given in[3] and this protocol is as secure
as the protocol[3] for integers summation. Using this pro-
posed protocol, we can compute the summation is given
by (Eq.21),
Γ =
m∑
i=1
y2imodN, (21)
where yi ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, ......N − 1} and N = 2n. In
this case each party will choose a secret integer yi and
compute (y2i mod N). Then, they make their binary
string and execute the above protocol[3]. We show a
simulation for three parties and one qubit secret state.
The simulation is given in Fig.20:
Fig.20: Circuit diagram for the square sum-
mation protocol.
Here, P1,P2 and P3 choose the secret integers 3,2 and 0
respectively. The oracle operators are identity operator.
7So, the square summation(Eq.22),
Γ =
m∑
i=1
y2imodN =
3∑
i=1
y2imod4 = (9 + 4 + 0)mod4 = 1.
(22)
According to the protocol, P1,P2 and P3 compute
(y2i mod N) and make their binary string and execute
the secure multiparty quantum summation. The result
of this simulation is given in Fig.21,
Fig.21: Figure showing the simulated result of
the proposed protocol for square summation. The
state 01(binary representation of 1) is obtained
with probability 1.0.
This proposed protocol for square summation isn’t
bounded within the square only. Using the same pro-
tocol we can compute summation for cubes and higher
powers. The simulation for cubic summation is given in
Figs.22 and 23,
Fig.22: Circuit diagram for the cubic summa-
tion protocol.
Here, P1,P2 and P3 choose the secret integers 3,2 and
0 respectively. According to the protocol, P1,P2 and P3
compute (y3i mod N) and make their binary string and
execute the secure multiparty quantum summation. The
result should be (Eq.23),
Ω =
m∑
i=1
y3imodN =
3∑
i=1
y3imod4 = (27 + 8 + 0)mod4 = 3.
(23)
Here, the oracle operators for P2 and P3 are identity
operator.
Fig.23: Figure showing the simulated result of
the proposed protocol for cubic summation. The
state 11(binary representation of 3) is obtained
with probability 1.0.
VI. CONCLUSION
A protocol for secure multiparty quantum summation
has been described[3] and experimentally implemented
here for one qubit secret integer using the five-qubit
superconductivity[4],[5],[6] based quantum computer of
IBM Corporation placed on the cloud named “Quantum
Experience”.
The generalization of this protocol for summation of 2 &
3 qubit secret state and square and cubic summation are
demonstrated using Custom Topology (a quantum sim-
ulator of IBM Quantum Experience). Due to the limita-
tions of the ibmqx2 processor, it is not possible to experi-
mentally execute this protocol for two and three qubit se-
cret state. However, IBM Corporation has already made
a sixteen-qubit processor(ibmqx3). Using this ibmqx3
processor, one can overcome those limitations. However,
till now, it is not available for all users.
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